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Abstract 
Banks reliance on short-term funding has increased over time. While an effective source 
of financing in good times, the 2007 financial crisis has exposed the vulnerability of 
banks and ultimately firms to such a liability structure. The authors show that banks that 
relied most on wholesale funding were the ones to contract its lending the most during 
the crisis. Their results suggest that banks propagate liquidity shocks by reducing credit 
only to a certain type of borrower. Importantly, in the financial crisis banks passed the 
liquidity shock only to public firms. Furthermore, long-term relationships between firms 
and banks played an important role during the crisis. Public firms with weak banking 
relationships pre-crisis experienced a greater credit crunch than other public borrowers. 
JEL classification: G01, G20 
Bank classification: Financial institutions 
Résumé 
Le recours des banques au financement de court terme s’est accru au fil des ans. Bien que 
cette pratique soit efficace lorsque tout va bien, la crise financière de 2007 a mis au jour 
la vulnérabilité des banques et donc celle des entreprises à une telle structure de passif. 
Les auteurs montrent que les banques les plus tributaires du financement de gros sont 
celles qui ont le plus réduit leurs prêts durant la crise. D’après leur analyse, les banques 
contribuent à la propagation des chocs de liquidité en diminuant uniquement les crédits 
qu’elles accordent à un certain type d’emprunteur. Lors de la dernière crise financière en 
particulier, elles n’ont répercuté le choc de liquidité que sur les entreprises cotées en 
bourse. Les auteurs constatent que les relations à long terme que les firmes nouent avec 
les banques ont également beaucoup joué  : les entreprises cotées qui, avant la crise, 
n’entretenaient pas de relations suivies de ce type ont davantage souffert du resserrement 
du crédit que les autres sociétés ouvertes. 
Classification JEL : G01, G20 
Classification de la Banque : Institutions financières 
 
 1 Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has intensiﬁed the debate on bank lending behavior. Continued
write-downs in 2008 by U.S. banks raised the question of whether impaired banks would
be able to continue lending. A banking crisis may aﬀect the real economy by reducing
ﬁrms’ credit and hence investment and consumption. While the theoretical literature
suggests a framework where banks’ ﬁnancial conditions can aﬀect the performance of
their borrowers (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder (1988)), empirical studies face a challenge in
tracing the channels through which shocks are transmitted. Separating out demand and
supply eﬀects is diﬃcult because a common economic shock may drive the performance
of both banks and ﬁrms. For example, a contraction of bank lending may be due to
their unwillingness to lend, or to lower demand for credit. In this paper, we use matched
bank-ﬁrm panel data to isolate what appears to be a shift in loan supply across banks
and a shift in loan demand across ﬁrms. We investigate loan issuance of Canadian banks
who faced an exogenous adverse shock in short-term wholesale funding markets. The
results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in wholesale funding prior to the
2007-2009 crisis leads to a 11% reduction in ﬁrm credit during the crisis.
As a neighboring country and the largest U.S. trading partner, Canada entered the
recession with critically important advantages (Ratnovski and Huang (2009)). Canadian
ﬁnancial institutions were in good health, corporate balance sheets were robust and
household debt was not as large as in some other advanced countries. Furthermore, the
Canadian banking system has historically been less reliant on wholesale funding than
the American system, suggesting that it should have been less vulnerable to a liquidity
shock in the short-term wholesale funding market. Notably, Canadian banks emerged
as “world class lenders” post-crisis.1
1The Financial Times (14 September, 2010) reports that “the ﬁve biggest banks—Royal Bank of
Canada, Toronto-Dominion, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Bank of
1Therefore, Canadian banks are a well-suited laboratory to analyze whether banks
that relied more on wholesale funding prior to the crisis changed their lending behaviour
during the crisis. If they curtailed lending during the crisis, it would not have been be-
cause of write-downs but because of a US-transmitted liquidity shock. We ﬁrst analyze
the dynamics of wholesale funding of Canadian banks pre- and post-crisis. Our hypoth-
esis is that when the wholesale market dried up, banks that had initially relied most on
wholesale funding curtail lending most aggressively during the crisis. This hypothesis
is consistent with the bank lending view (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). Banks cannot
frictionlessly access alternative sources of funding in the short-run, therefore banks with
greater exposure to wholesale sources had to cut lending more aggressively in the crisis.
From a ﬁrms’ perspective if there is a credit crunch banks will choose, at the margin,
to cut lending to more risky ﬁrms (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Assuming that private
ﬁrms are subject to greater asymmetric information problems than public ﬁrms, we
should observe larger credit cuts to private ﬁrms than to public ﬁrms, holding all else
equal (Gertler and Girlchrist (1994), Kashyap et al. (2002)). On the other hand, having
access to alternative ﬁnancing sources, public ﬁrms may switch to alternative ﬁnancing
during a crisis (Hale and Santos (2010)). Thus, one may observe lower loan amounts in
public ﬁrms due to cost-eﬃcient switching from banks to other sources of credit. While
the aggregate impact on credit in this case may remain unchanged as ﬁrms substitute
one source of ﬁnancing with another, the decrease in bank loans at the ﬁrm level can be
viewed as supply-driven. Private ﬁrms, on the other hand, have limited access to bond
markets and thus must bear the liquidity shock. To address these issues, we exploit
the sensitivity of loan issuance to wholesale funding separately for publicly traded and
Montreal—have survived the crisis in better shape than most of their US and European counterparts.
None required any direct injection of capital from taxpayers, and all maintained their dividends. Royal
and TD are among a handful of banks around the world that still carry a Moodys triple A credit rating.
Their capital buﬀers remain well above regulatory thresholds, with tier one capital ratios ranging from
11.7 per cent at Scotiabanks to 14.2 per cent at CIBC.”
2private ﬁrms.
Banking relationships are yet another factor that may aﬀect the availability of credit
in times of crisis. Banks create value by screening and monitoring borrowers, which
decreases information asymmetry between a borrower and a lender. As a result borrowers
obtain a larger loan amount compared to borrowers that did not have such relationships
(e.g., Berger and Udell (1995), Bharath et al. (2011)). Long-term banking relationships
can be particularly beneﬁcial in times of crisis as they can facilitate the access to credit
(Rajan and Petersen (1994)). On the other hand, if a single bank is hit by a severe
liquidity shock, it may be beneﬁcial to have diversiﬁed relationships across many banks.
In the case of syndicated loans, there is an asymmetric information problem known
as “syndicate moral hazard.” It arises between the lead arranger, who is responsible for
monitoring the loan, and other participants. To attenuate moral hazard, the lead ar-
ranger has to retain a high share of a loan to borrowers requiring high level of monitoring
(Suﬁ (2007)). This type of moral hazard, however, can be exacerbated in times of crisis
and eventually it can lead to lower availability of credit. For example, since monitoring
is costly a lead arranger may not be willing to retain a higher portion of a loan. In this
case other participants would expect a higher rate to compensate for the lower level of
monitoring, If not, the loan amount, and hence the need for monitoring, may decrease.
We rely on panel data from the Canadian syndicated loan market during the period
1990 to 2010:Q1. We also have complete bank balance sheet data and balance sheet
characteristics for public borrowers. We observe that newly issued syndicated lending
in Canada started to fall in 2007:Q2. On a quarterly basis, it decreased by 76% over
the period 2007:Q4-2009:Q1, while business loans (less drawdowns) remained near their
pre-crisis level. Observing that syndicated loans were heavily aﬀected by the crisis, we
consider them to be the appropriate avenue for examining the relationship between a
funding shock and credit access.
3We use the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology to examine whether banks with dif-
ferent exposure to the crisis change their lending policy during the crisis. To control
for loan demand, we control for a large set of observable ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects. We show that banks that were more exposed to wholesale funding before
the crisis reduced their syndicated lending the most during the crisis. Our results are
economically signiﬁcant—an increase in wholesale funding from the 25th to the 75th
percentile pre-crisis is associated with a 11% drop in loans. We ﬁnd that the magnitude
of credit supply reduction due to exposure to the wholesale funding market is present
only in public ﬁrms. We also document that the lending cut is more pronounced for
ﬁrms that invested relatively less during the crisis.
In addition, we ﬁnd that bank-ﬁrm relationships play an important role during the
crisis. Using a multivariate analysis, we ﬁrst document that public ﬁrms maintain more
multiple banking relationships than private ﬁrms. To the extent that multiple banking
relationships is a proxy for weak relationships, we expect a negative correlation between
this proxy and loan amount.
We ﬁnd that public ﬁrms with multiple banking relationships pre-crisis did experi-
ence the largest cuts to credit during the crisis. Furthermore, this eﬀect is more pro-
nounced involving banks where syndicate moral hazard likely increased the most during
the crisis, that is, in cases involving large public ﬁrms (requiring large loans with many
participants) with banks exposed to the liquidity shock in the wholesale funding market.
Our results contribute to several strands of literature. First, this paper complements
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), who ﬁnd that U.S. banks with greater exposure to
short-term credit cut syndicated lending more aggressively than banks that relied on
insured deposits. Similar conclusions are oﬀered by Gozzi and Goetz (2010) using U.S.
bank-level data. By focusing on the Canadian syndicated market, we beneﬁt from better
identiﬁcation of the transmission of the funding shock since it is exogenous. We also
4shed some light on the Canadian banking system, which was labeled the most resilient
among developed economies, yet not well understood.
Our study is also related to recent work by Santos (2010) and Hale and Santos (2010),
who examine the cost of syndicated loans during the crisis. The ﬁrst study focuses on
the role of bank losses during the crisis on the cost of loans, while the second study
traces the link between a bank’s reliance on the bond market and the cost of loans.
More generally, our paper contributes to a broader literature that identiﬁes the role of
bank funding constraints on credit supply (e.g., Leary (2009)).
Finally, we contribute to the large literature on relationship lending. Berger and Udell
(1995) and Rajan and Petersen (1994) posit that relationships are valuable for private
ﬁrms because, for example, ﬁrms with strong banking relationships receive more credit
in times of crisis. Using syndicated loan data for the U.S., Bharath et al. (2011) show
that a borrower with a prior relationship is able to obtain larger loan amounts. Looking
at the latest ﬁnancial turmoil, De Mitri et al. (2010) show that Italian ﬁrms that were
borrowing from more banks suﬀered on average a larger contraction in bank credit and
a higher probability of experiencing a reduction in outstanding bank debt. Since the
Canadian banking system is more concentrated, relationships are expected to play an
important role.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data and
sample selection. Section 3 presents methodology. Section 4 presents the results, and
Section 5 focuses on ﬁrm-bank relationships. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Sample Selection
The data used in this study comes from several sources, including Loan Pricing Corpora-
tions’s Dealscan (LPC), Compustat, and banking data compiled by the Bank of Canada
5and the Oﬃce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI).2
We use the Dealscan data to identify Canadian ﬁrms that obtained syndicated loans
from 1990 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2010. Dealscan provides information on newly issued
syndicated loans, their purpose and type, maturity, seniority, and the identity and role
of the banks in the loan syndicate. The total number of facilities is 4,926 and the total
number of deals is 3,413. Each deal may consist of several tranches (facilities) that diﬀer
in terms of maturity, pricing, and/or amount. Borrowers operate in diﬀerent industries:
the three largest sectors at the one-digit SIC level are mining and construction ﬁrms
(23%), manufacturing (28%) and transportation (16%). of all ﬁrms.
Balance sheet information on public ﬁrms is provided by Compustat.3 The balance
sheet data are from the quarter prior to the facility active date. We do not have ﬁrm
level information for private ﬁrms apart from their industry classiﬁcation and credit
ratings, both provided by DealScan. Since we are interested in comparing the impact
of the crisis on public and private ﬁrms, we keep both types of ﬁrms in our sample and
estimate regression models with and without ﬁrm controls. Typically studies only focus
on public ﬁrms.
Finally, we merge bank-level data with Dealscan. To identify lead arrangers we rely
on the procedure suggested in Suﬁ (2007).4 We retrieve information for about thirty
domestic banks, foreign banks subsidiaries, and foreign bank branches, all regulated by
OSFI.5 These lenders originate 72% of the total volume of syndicated loans granted to
Canadian ﬁrms; the rest are originated by foreign institutions.
2The aggregate version of the bank data is publicly available: Tables C1 and C2 from the Bank of
Canada Banking and Financial Statistics. Disaggregated data are conﬁdential.
3To merge DealScan and Compustat we use a link ﬁle graciously provided by Michael Roberts, as
used in Chava and Roberts (2008).
4We use the custom report from the web version of LoanConnector to extract the names of lead
arrangers from variables “Lenders-All Lenders” and “Lender-Lead Arranger”. If the ﬁeld is missing
then we use “Lead Role” variable in the “Lenders-All Lenders” as a lead arranger.
5See www.osﬁ-bsif.gc.ca about the conditions under which OSFI regulates ﬁnancial institutions in
Canada.
62.1 Basic Facts about the Canadian Syndicated Loan Market
In this section we describe the Canadian syndicated lending market.6 Figure 1 shows the
total volume of newly issued syndicated loans, corporate bonds and commercial paper
to Canadian borrowers from 2000 to November 2010. Similar to other credit markets,
the syndicated market grew substantially over the past decade. The total amount of
newly issued loans in 2000 was $82 billion and it grew to $192.4 billion in 2007, the
peak of the credit boom. In 2007 the corporate bond market totalled $100.6 billion and
the commercial paper market totalled $173.5 billion. The syndicated loans therefore
comprised a substantial portion of the total credit in the economy. With the start of the
crisis in 2007, syndicated lending dropped to $93.7 billion by 2009, which is comparable
to the decrease in the commercial paper market. There was a similar drop in the bond
market, although it did not occur as immediate as the syndicated loan market or the
commercial paper market. Corporate bond issuance only fell in 2009.
There are several major types of syndicated loan facilities: revolving credit lines, term
loans, letters of credit, and acquisitions of credit line.7 In Canada, 72% of all syndicated
loans are revolving credit lines, which is higher than in the U.S., where 50% of the loans
are credit lines. Figure 2 shows that the total amount of originated credit lines was $37
6The Canadian syndicated loan market (comprised of Canadian borrowers) is not as well un-
derstood as the U.S. one, which is examined in a large number of papers (e.g., Suﬁ (2007),
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)). Syndicated loans are provided by a group of lenders. There are
usually two groups of banks in the syndicate. Acting as arrangers, lead managers, or agents, senior
syndicate members are appointed by the borrower to construct a deal. By sharing a loan across mul-
tiple banks, senior banks avoid excessive exposure to credit and market risk and related compliance.
At the same time they earn fees and maintain relationships with borrowers. The fees associated with
syndicated loans are upfront fees, the commitment fee, facility fee, administrative agent fee, letter of
credit fee, and cancelation or prepayment fee. Junior banks do not earn fees, however, they beneﬁt
from increasing their origination capability and the opportunity to maintain a future relationship with
borrowers. See Taylor and Sansone (2007) for details on loan syndication.
7Revolving credit lines allow borrowers to draw down, repay and re-borrow. This facility acts much
like credit cards, except that borrowers are charged an annual commitment fee on unused amounts. A
term loan is an installment loan which is drawn during a short commitment period and then is repaid.
Acquisition lines are credits that may be drawn down for a given period to purchase speciﬁed assets or
equipment in order to make acquisitions.
7billion in 2003 and climbed to $137 billion in 2007. There is a substantial heterogeneity
in loan types across countries. For example, revolving credit lines comprise a much
smaller portions of the UK and Australian markets, around 40% and 20%, respectively.
The second largest category in Canada is term loans, worth 28% of total volumes.
In terms of reasons for borrowing, the two most popular categories in Canada are
real ivestment loans (capital expenditures, working capital or general corporate purposes
(58%)), followed by acquisitions (15%). Figure 2 shows that the total amount of real
investment loans was $27.3 billion in 2003 and peaked at $130 billion in 2007. Similar
to the U.S. syndicated loans are rarely used for leveraged buy-outs in Canada.
In Canada both public and private borrowers use syndicated loans—47% of all syn-
dicated loans are originated by private ﬁrms. An interesting observation is that the total
volume of originated loans by private ﬁrms is more stable over time than for public ﬁrms.
For example, for the period 2000 to 2006 the amount of syndicated loans to public ﬁrms
increased more than four times on a yearly basis, while for private ﬁrms it increased one
and a half times (Figure 3). Then at the start of the crisis public ﬁrms experienced a
much larger drop in syndicated lending than private ﬁrms.
As can be seen from Figure 4, new lending starts falling with the start of the crisis.
By the ﬁrst quarter of 2008, the dollar volume of lending was 36% lower than it was in
the second quarter of 2007. This continued throughout 2009, so that the overall drop
from 2007:Q2 to 2009:Q1 was 76%. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) report a similar
pattern for syndicated lending in the U.S. Notably, the same pattern is observed for
credit lines and real investment loans. The total amount of credit lines in Canada is
80% lower in 2009:Q1 compared to 2007:Q2, and 79% for real investment loans.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the key variables used in our analysis. The
loan statistics are at a facility level, the ﬁrm characteristics are at a ﬁrm-quarter level
and the bank characteristics are at a bank-month level. The mean size of the loans in the
8sample is $300 million and the median is $115 million. Expectedly, the typical Canadian
loan facilities are slightly smaller than those reported by Suﬁ (2007) and Bharath et al.
(2011) for the U.S. The mean loan maturity is 41 months. The mean spread is 223 basis
points. The mean size of a syndicate is 5.23 lenders and the mean share of the lead
arranger is 36%, both comparable with the summary statistics reported in Suﬁ (2007).
Using Compustat data, borrowing ﬁrms have on average $3,686 million in assets (me-
dian is $1,188 million). The means of the market-to-book ratio, tangibility, proﬁtability,
leverage, current ratio, all winsorized at the 1% and 99%, are respectively 1.26, 0.3, 0.28,
0.29 and 1.4. For U.S. borrowers, Bharath et al. (2011) report the means of the same
variables to be 1.75, 0.34, 0.14, 0.25, 2.08. Overall, the structure of the Canadian syn-
dicated loan market and the borrowers’ characteristics are closely comparable to those
in the U.S.
Over the entire sample period, the average fraction of banks’ cash over assets is 6%
per month, and the Tier 1 capital over assets is 9%. A proxy for the riskiness of lenders
is the ratio of impaired business loans to total business loans. The mean ratio is 3%.8
We use a broad deﬁnition for wholesale funding ratio that is deposits by deposit-taking
institutions (ﬁxed term and demand and notice deposits by deposit-taking institutions),
banker acceptances and repo to total funding (wholesale funding and retail deposits).
The average wholesale funding ratio is 41%.
In Table 2 we report the market shares of the top ten banks in the Canadian syn-
dicated market. Although 190 banks participate in the syndicated market, the top ten
banks comprise 82% of the market, and the top ﬁve largest Canadian banks comprise
62% of the market. During the crisis, the top Canadian banks’ market share fell to 55%.
8From an accounting point, when a loan or portfolio of loans becomes impaired as a result of a
deterioration in credit quality and the lender no longer has reasonable assurance of timely collection
of the full amount of principal and interest, the carrying amount of the loans should be reduced. This
reduction should be recognized as a charge in the statement of income in the period in which impairment
is identiﬁed.
9Foreign banks registered in Canada comprised 4% of the market before the crisis and
only 1% afterwards. The share of foreign ﬁnancial institutions increases from 30% to
40% pre-post crisis.
In Table 3 we report summary statistics for private and public ﬁrms separately.
The average loan size for public ﬁrms is $130 million larger than for private ﬁrms.
The average number of deals per borrower is higher for the public ﬁrms. Also, public
borrowers prefer loans with shorter maturity (almost 5 months shorter) and from larger
syndicates than private borrowers. Public borrowers interact with 2.11 diﬀerent lead
arrangers on average, while private ﬁrms with 1.19.
2.2 Funding conditions in Canada
In mid-2008, the conﬁdence between banks in the U.S. declined and this resulted in a
breakdown in interbank markets as credit ratings declined and valuation losses increased.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 exacerbated the loss of conﬁdence
and thus the shock spread from the interbank market to CDS market, the commercial
paper market, the markets for covered bonds and bank bonds, and other long-term
funding markets.
In Canada, the concern about the U.S. market began in the summer of 2007. Figure 5
shows the spread between CDOR and OIS rates. An increase in the spread is an indicator
of banks unwillingness to lend to each other. We see that spreads start increasing in
the summer of 2007 and more so in the fall of 2008. The growing risk caused declines
in the volumes of commercial paper, bankers acceptances, repo and interbank lending
markets. Figure 6 shows the quarterly percentage change in wholesale funding ratios of
Canadian banks relative to 2007:Q4 levels. The decline is observable across all deﬁnitions
of wholesale funding.9
9If wholesale funding is deﬁned as the sum of banker acceptances, repos, ﬁxed term, and demand
103 Methodology
The methodology consists of two parts. First, we investigate whether loan size varies
with banks’ exposure to wholesale funding. Second, we examine the role of lending
relationships.
3.1 Loan amounts and wholesale funding
To analyze whether loan activity declined during the crisis, and if so whether the de-
cline was more pronounced for banks with a stronger reliance on wholesale funding, we
estimate the following baseline regression:











ηpLp;l;t + νi + λb + θt + ϵiblt, (1)
where Log(Loans)lbit is the natural log of facility l, granted by bank b (lead arranger)
to ﬁrm i at date t. CRISIS is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the period 2007:Q4
to 2009:Q4, and zero otherwise.10 WHOLESALEbt 1 is the monthly ratio of wholesale
funding to total funding. Wholesale funding includes ﬁxed term, demand and notice de-
posits by deposit-taking institutions, acceptances, and obligations related to assets sold
and notice deposits by deposit-taking institutions, the drop from the second quarter of 2007 to the forth
quarter of 2009 is 13%; if repos and bank acceptances are excluded from the above deﬁnition, then the
drop for the same period is 40%. Looking at the three year period from 2004:Q1 to 2007:Q2, wholesale
funding had increased by 40%.
10We estimate equation (1) both at the facility and the deal levels. Some deals have more than one
tranche. Tranches diﬀer in terms of purpose, amount, maturity etc. Since we focus on loan amounts, it
is important to account for loan characteristics precisely at the facility level as opposed to aggregating
them at the deal level. The drawback, however, is that facilities at the deal level are not independent
observations for deals with multiple tranches, which may result in lower standard errors. As a robustness
check, we cluster the standard errors at the deal level.
11under repurchase agreements (repo) as a ratio of total funding which includes wholesale
funding, demand and ﬁxed term deposits to individuals (retail funding). We ﬁx the
wholesale funding ratio during the crisis (2007:Q4 to 2009:Q4) to be equal to the mean
of its pre-crisis values from 2007:Q1 to 2007:Q3.11 In this way, we address the possibility
that syndicated loans and wholesale funding may be aﬀected by common unobserved
factors during the crisis. Also, this modiﬁcation allows us to examine the lending be-
haviour of banks with diﬀerent pre-crisis exposures to wholesale funding. Fj;i;t 1 and
Bs;b;t 1 are lagged values of ﬁrm and bank characteristics respectively; Lp;l;t denotes loan
characteristics such as type of loan, purpose, and syndicate size; νi, λb, and θt are ﬁxed
eﬀects for ﬁrm, bank, and year, respectively.
The key coeﬃcient of interest is µ, which estimates the extent to which banks that
relied on wholesale funding changed their lending behaviour during the crisis, relative to
the pre-crisis period. As liquidity in wholesale markets dried up, we expect that banks
that relied on this type of ﬁnancing to issue fewer loans. Therefore, we expect µ to
be negative. If banks relied on alternative sources of ﬁnancing, however, the coeﬃcient
should be insigniﬁcant.
Firms characteristics are retrieved at the quarterly frequency from Compustat. Our
choice of control variables follows the existing literature (e.g., Santos (2010), Bharath et al.
(2011)). Log(rm assets) is the log of the ﬁrm’s assets in million of dollars. Larger ﬁrms
are more diversiﬁed and consequently should be less risky. Protability is the ratio of
EBITDA divided by sales. More proﬁtable ﬁrms can service their debt more securely
than less proﬁtable ﬁrms and thus they have more access to credit. Leverage is the book
value of debt to total assets and serves as a proxy of default—greater leverage should
lead to smaller loan amounts. Tangibility—inventories plus plant, property, and equip-
11As a robustness check, we change the pre-crisis period to the year 2006 and the results remain
unchanged.
12ment over assets—is a proxy for collateral, which should be positively related to loan
size. M/B is ﬁrm market value over its book value. It is a proxy of growth opportunities
and the relationship to loans is expected to be negative. Current ratio is the ratio of
current assets to current liabilities.
Loan size is likely to be aﬀected by loan characteristics. We include the purpose of
the loan and the type of the loan (credit line vs. term loan), loan maturity (in months)
and the syndicate size.
We also include lead-bank characteristics. To control for lead-bank size, we use the
log of monthly bank assets (Log(bank assets)). Large banks are expected to be better
diversiﬁed, and/or have access to funding at better conditions and thus provide larger
loans. Well-capitalized banks can better shield their lending from shocks as they have
easier access to uninsured funding, consistent with the “bank lending channel” (e.g.,
Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). Also, it is possible that well-capitalized banks have ex-
tended loans to risky borrowers that are more exposed to economic downturns, suggest-
ing a negative relationship between capital and lending. To capture the eﬀect of bank
liquidity on syndicate lending we include the ratio of cash to total assets (Cash/Assets).
We include ﬁrm- and bank-ﬁxed eﬀects to account for the role of unobservable time
invariant factors that may aﬀect loan amounts. We also include quarterly, monthly and
yearly eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
3.2 The eﬀect of credit line drawdowns
Before turning to the results, we highlight a number of issues that could raise some
concerns about drawdowns on previous commitments. It is possible that during the
ﬁnancial crisis the reliance on wholesale funding captures exposures to general liquid-
ity risk. In other words, it is not that banks in particular propagate their own fund-
13ing constraint to the borrowers but rather they propagate the overall market dry-up.
Following this reasoning, we would expect loan contractions, presumably due to a gen-
eral liquidity shock, to be detected across all types of business loans, including non-
syndicated commercial loans. We focus on business loans less drawdowns, as suggested
by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), who argue that the observed increase in commercial
and industrial loans in the U.S. during the crisis is due to an increase in drawdowns of
existing loan commitments (credit lines). Figure 7 shows the quarterly change in syn-
dicated loans and total business loans (less drawdowns) relative to 2007:Q4 in Canada.
We observe that business loans (less drawdowns) remain almost unchanged. Syndicated
loans, however, experienced a signiﬁcant decrease during the crisis compared to business
loans, suggesting that the decrease in business lending is somewhat speciﬁc to syndicated
loans only.
The level of drawdowns on exiting credit lines may aﬀect the issuance of new loans.
Along with rising concerns about bank insolvency and liquidity in mid-2008, U.S. corpo-
rate borrowers increased drawdowns to ensure access to committed funds (Ivashina and Scharfstein
(2010) and Gozzi and Goetz (2010)). We observe similar patterns for Canadian borrow-
ers using data from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q4. Hence, not only do wholesale funding cuts
aﬀect new issuance, but sudden drawdowns may also play a role. To the extent that
drawdowns and wholesale funding are correlated, we face the risk of omitted variable
bias. To evaluate the direction of the bias on the estimate of wholesale funding in equa-
tions (1) and (2), we plot the relationship between the wholesale funding ratio and the
ratio of drawdowns to existing credit lines. Figure 8 shows that high wholesale fund-
ing is negatively correlated with drawdowns during the crisis. For example, one reason
for observing a lower ratio of wholesale funding and a high ratio of drawdowns is that
borrowers perceived banks whose wholesale funding dropped the most during the crisis
to be riskier, which made them draw down previous commitments. Equally plausible,
14as suggested by Gatev and Strahan (2006), ﬁnancial institutions maintain strong retail
funding (i.e., low wholesale funding) as it allows them to fund future credit lines. In
either case, the correlation between wholesale funding and drawdowns is negative. As
the correlation between drawdowns and new issuance is negative, and the correlation
between new drawdowns and wholesale funding is also negative any potential bias of the
estimate on wholesale funding (µ in (eq. 1)) will take a positive sign. Hence, prevent-
ing us from detecting even a greater impact of the pre-crisis wholesale funding on loan
reduction during the crisis.
4 Results
In this section we ﬁrst present results on the eﬀect of wholesale funding on syndicated
lending. We then explore the role of bank-ﬁrm relationships in syndicated lending.
Table 4 presents results for regressions of loan facilities (tranches) on ﬁrm, bank and
loan characteristics. We also include macro variables to capture the general deterioration
in market conditions. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (4) is the log of the
tranche amount, and in columns (3) and (5) it is the ratio of the tranche size to quarterly
ﬁrm assets. We report estimates for public and private ﬁrms separately. Columns (4)
and (5) include additional characteristics that are available only for public ﬁrms. All
speciﬁcations account for time, bank, and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.12
Our results are consistent with the hypotheses that banks that relied more on whole-
sale funding before the crisis decreased their lending to public ﬁrms relatively more during
the crisis. In particular, in columns (1), (3), (4) and (5) the estimate on the interaction
term CRISIS  WHOLESALE2007 is negative and signiﬁcant. From column (1), we
12Firm ﬁxed eﬀects control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics. For example banks might
be lending in a systematic way to ﬁrms who experience a larger drop in credit demand in a credit
crunch, i.e. the match between banks and ﬁrms is not random.
15see that a one-standard-deviation increase in the wholesale funding ratio pre-crisis leads
to an 11% drop in the average tranche post-crisis. The standard deviation of the ratio
of wholesale funding is 14%, which is equivalent to the interquartile range from the 25th
to the 75th percentiles. In other words, an increase in the wholesale funding ratio from
the 25th to the 75th percentile before 2007:Q4 is associated with a 11% fall in syndicate
loans during the crisis. In column (3) and (5), where the dependent variable is the ratio
of facility amount to total assets, the impact of wholesale funding is also economically
and statistically signiﬁcant—a one standard deviation increase is associated with a 18%
fall in the log ratio of syndicated loans to assets compared to the pre-crisis period.13
The results in column (2) suggest that banks with a high dependency on wholesale
funding did not transmit the liquidity shock to private borrowers. To the extent that
credit demand is driven by a common unobservable factor to both private and public
ﬁrms, looking at the diﬀerence in the sensitivity of pre-crisis wholesale funding to loan
issuance oﬀsets the role of these factors.
The underlying assumption for the results in Table 4 is that changes in demand
for loans during the crisis are not correlated with a bank’s dependence on wholesale
funding before the crisis. It is possible, however, that banks with higher dependence
on wholesale funding systematically lend to ﬁrms that happen to experience a larger
decrease in credit demand during the crisis, i.e., those ﬁrms match with banks non-
randomly. If so, the estimate of the interaction term between the wholesale funding ratio
and the crisis variable reﬂects reductions in loan demand that are more pronounced in
13If we redeﬁne wholesale funding as a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for values higher
than the sample median and zero otherwise, we obtain similar results (unreported)—banks with higher
than the median wholesale funding before the crisis decrease loans by 18%. Also, we specify wholesale
funding in two additional ways by sequentially subtracting the values of bankers acceptances and repos.
We also estimate a change regression where the pre- post-crisis change in loans for the same ﬁrm is
regressed on the change in wholesale funding. The results indicate that a more severe drop in wholesale
funding is associated with a greater fall drop in newly issued loans in the crisis period, holding all else
equal. The drawback of this speciﬁcation, however, is that not all ﬁrms take loans pre- and post-crisis.
16ﬁrms borrowing from banks that relied on wholesale funding pre-crisis. To address this
concern we include ﬁrm and bank ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobservable time-invariant
characteristics.
In addition to including ﬁxed eﬀects that capture unobservable time-invariant factors,
diﬀerences in credit demand across banks can be aﬀected by time-varying bank-speciﬁc
factors. Relatively large banks with well diversiﬁed portfolios may have lent to riskier
borrowers whose demand for credit is more vulnerable to a crisis. There is a large
literature that focuses on the link between bank capital and risk aversion (e.g., Flannery
(1989)). If well-capitalized banks choose ex ante a loan portfolio with higher return and
risk, their borrowers would be, on average more exposed to economic downturns. Thus,
banks with high capital may target more risky borrowers. On the other hand, high levels
of capital increases banks’ capacity to raise uninsured debt and therefore its ability to
cope with a shock to wholesale funding (Ashcraft (2006)). In our speciﬁcation, the
estimate on capital is neither statistically nor economically signiﬁcant. We also control
for the ratio of cash over assets. Assuming that cash and loans are substitutes, we ﬁnd
that banks with more cash lend less.
The estimates of ﬁrm characteristics in all speciﬁcations take the expected signs.
Typically, ﬁrms with high growth opportunities (high market-to-book ratio) have lower
leverage ratios. One explanation is that these ﬁrms are likely to have good future
prospects relative to the value of their assets in place. Although growth opportunities
add to the ﬁrm’s value they do not add to taxable income. In our speciﬁcation the
estimate on M/B is neither statistically nor economically signiﬁcant. Firms with rela-
tively high levels of tangible assets (the ratio of ﬁxed assets over total assets) have more
collateral and thus manage to take larger loans.14
14In results not reported here we interact the ﬁrm variables with the crisis dummy variable to account
for any potential diﬀerential impact of ﬁrm characteristics on lending before and during the crisis. The
(available upon request) results show that the impact of ﬁrm characteristics on syndicate loans is similar
17We account for ﬁnancial market conditions with the yield spreads of triple-A cor-
porate bonds.15 The estimate on wholesale funding is signiﬁcant when including macro
and ﬁnance variables, suggesting that wholesale funding brings additional information
such as bank-speciﬁc exposure to the crisis. Omitting macroeconomic and ﬁnancial mar-
ket factors biases the estimate slightly upwards. Assuming that the public ﬁrms in our
sample can substitute bonds and syndicated loans, the estimate on the yield spread can
be interpreted as the alternative cost of ﬁnancing. On average, higher bond yields make
bank loans more preferable, which is consistent with the positive estimate on the spread
for the sample of public ﬁrms.
4.1 Do banks reduce credit supply more to some ﬁrms?
We study whether the eﬀect of wholesale funding on loan availability diﬀers across ﬁrms.
For that purpose, in addition to bank, ﬁrm, and loan control variables, we introduce
interaction terms related to various ﬁrm characteristics. In column (1) of Table 5, we
formally examine whether the liquidity shock aﬀects public and private ﬁrms diﬀerently.
Indeed, the negative sign on the estimate of CRISISPUBLICWHOLESALE2007
suggests that banks that relied on wholesale funding cut lending to public ﬁrms more
than to private ﬁrms. Moreover, splitting the sample into public and private ﬁrms, as
reported in Table 4, shows that private ﬁrms do not actually experience a reduction in
lending due to banks’ exposure to the shock.
In column (2) we observe that the credit supply contraction is stronger for those
public ﬁrms that invested in production relatively less during the crisis. The question
of whether a ﬁrm’s choice of investment is driven by the lack of credit ﬁnancing and/or
before and during the crisis.
15More speciﬁcally, this is an index of the seven year bond yields of Canadian corporations over the
corresponding yields of Government of Canada bond. In unreported speciﬁcations, we consider bonds
with diﬀerent maturity and diﬀerent rating class. The conclusions are preserved.
18weak economic environment is beyond the scope of our paper. Rather, we observe that
credit rationing is correlated with low levels of investment. In column (3), we estimate
investment equations for the sample of all Canadian public ﬁrms reported in Compustat.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms that have access to syndicated loans during the crisis have higher
levels of investment compared to other public ﬁrms, suggesting that the ﬁrms that took




If the negative relation between wholesale funding and loans is demand driven, we would
expect to ﬁnd a similar pattern after September 11, 2001 which is assumed to have been
a demand shock to the economy (Duchin et al. (2010)). The results in the upper panel
of Table 6 show a quite diﬀerent pattern in 2001 than the recent ﬁnancial crisis. We
observe that high wholesale funding before 2001 is associated with less loan origination.
This negative eﬀect is subdued after 2001, which is exactly the opposite of the evidence
during the recent crisis. Without shedding light on the reasons that explain the pattern
in 2001, we note that the relationship between wholesale funding and lending is diﬀerent
for the 2001 demand shock and the most recent supply shock.16
16It is possible that during the crisis credit demand was aﬀected by unobserved changes in investment
opportunities that are correlated with wholesale funding. Following Duchin et al. (2010), we address
this issue by purging away the variation in ﬁrm characteristics during the crisis by ﬁxing them at
their pre-crisis levels (2007:Q1 to 2007:Q3). The assumption is that pre-crisis demand for credit is not
positively correlated with unobservable changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand shocks during the crisis. The
results (unreported) imply that the estimate of wholesale funding is negative and similar in magnitude
to the estimates in Table 4.
194.2.2 Wholesale funding and bank risk
The eﬀects of the exposure to wholesale funding on lending may be consistent with the
following argument. Banks with strong wholesale funding before the crisis may have been
more risk taking, in a sense that they may have issued loans with lower credit quality.
Finding a negative relationship between wholesale funding and lending may therefore be
the result of revealed bad credit quality. If this hypothesis is true, however, we would
expect wholesale funding in the crisis to be a ‘proxy’ for bank risk. To address this
possibility, we include the fraction of impaired business loans to total business loans as
a proxy for bank risk. If wholesale funding is a proxy for bank risk, we would expect its
impact to be insigniﬁcant once we explicitly control for bank risk. The results, presented
in the middle panel of Table 6 show that the drop in the sensitivity of wholesale funding
to lending is preserved, however at a slightly lower magnitude.
4.2.3 Syndicate ﬁxed eﬀects
Unobserved syndicate-speciﬁc characteristics may be correlated with a bank’s whole-
sale funding. It may be the case that banks manage to attract more wholesale funding
because of their participation in ‘high’ quality syndicates. Also, banks within the syndi-
cate may fund each other at better terms because of the existing syndicate relationships.
Therefore, we include syndicate ﬁxed eﬀects to account for unobserved time-invariant
factors related to the syndicate. Overall, the estimates on the interaction term between
CRISIS  WHOLESALE2007 in columns (1) to (5) in Table 6 are similar to those
in Table 4, suggesting that the inclusion of unobserved syndicate characteristics do not
change our conclusions.
205 The Role of Relationships during the Crisis?
Rajan and Petersen (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Bharath et al. (2011), among
others, suggest that lending relationships have an impact on various price and non-price
loan terms. Long-term relationships between ﬁrms and banks allow banks to access
proprietary information about the borrowers, which can reduce information asymmetries
and hence be beneﬁcial to ﬁrms by ensuring more access to capital at a lower cost and
with less collateral. On the other hand, the cost of long term bank-ﬁrm relationships
is that banks have access to private information which may lead to a hold-up problem
and extraction of information rents, particularly for borrowers with limited access to
alternative funding sources.
We start by estimating a probit model of whether a borrower has more than one prior
banking relationships. We control for a set of ﬁrm characteristics and time eﬀects and
ﬁnd that on average public ﬁrms are more likely to develop relationships with multiple
banks. This is consistent with the argument of Berger and Udell (1995) that single
banking relationships are more valuable to private ﬁrms as they allow lenders to collect
information about the borrower over longer periods of time. Since lenders can refer to
available public information about borrowers, relationship lending is less valuable for
public ﬁrms, which is supported by the evidence of multiple banking relationships.
In syndicated loans, the lead arrangers monitoring eﬀort is unobservable and thus
creates a moral hazard problem among members of the syndicate (Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997)). To minimize this problem, the lead arranger retains a large share of the loan.
Banks that are more aﬀected by the crisis may ﬁnd it costly to commit to monitoring
through retaining a larger portion of the loan. Indeed, we ﬁnd that banks with high
wholesale funding prior the crisis reduce their share by 3% during the crisis. Alterna-
tively, we conjecture that banks can decrease the amount they lend and hence the value
21of monitoring. We expect borrowers with whom banks have the weakest relationships
to experience a larger cut to lending relative to the rest.
To examine the role of the bank-lending relationship in the context of syndicated
loans, we augment equation (1) by interacting REL MANY , that is a dummy variable
for having more than one banking relationship in the past, with CRISISWHOLESALE2007.
Table 7 reports the estimates of these regressions separately for public and private
ﬁrms. For brevity, the coeﬃcients of loan, ﬁrm, and bank controls are not reported
but are similar to those reported in Table 4. In column (1), the negative sign on
WHOLESALE2007  REL MANY  CRISIS suggests that greater exposure to the
crisis through high wholesale funding is associated with greater cuts to lending for bor-
rowers that had past relationships with multiple banks.
One reason for this could be that a lead arranger with high wholesale funding dete-
riorates the quality of the syndicate and therefore these syndicates cut new lending. We
therefore control in column (3) for syndicate quality with syndicate ﬁxed eﬀects. The
magnitude of WHOLESALE2007REL MANY CRISIS has signiﬁcantly decreased,
which suggests that once we account for the quality of syndicate lending, the impact of
wholesale funding and multiple banking relationships of loan amounts is purged away.
Hence, the eﬀect of WHOLESALE2007  REL MANY  CRISIS can be explained
with decreased quality of those syndicates in which one or more of the lead arrangers
were heavily exposed to the crisis.
6 Concluding Remarks
As conﬁdence between U.S. banks worsened due to downgrading and write-downs in mid
2008, the interbank market was severely impaired. Banks began to hoard liquidity for
precautionary purposes. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 further
22deteriorated conﬁdence among market participants. Thus, the shock spread to all mar-
kets such as commercial paper markets, repo and bond markets. Although, the liquidity
shock did not originate in the Canadian ﬁnancial system, it had secondary eﬀects on
its funding markets. In this paper, we examine how the liquidity shock aﬀected bank
lending activity in Canada using detailed information about banks, borrowers and loan
characteristics. We ﬁnd that public ﬁrms experienced a greater cut in lending and thus
suﬀered the cost of the ﬁnancial constraint of banks that relied on wholesale funding
sources before the crisis. Also, we document that during the crisis banks that were most
exposed to the crisis cut lending to public ﬁrms with multiple banking relationships.
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Commercial Paper Syndicated Loans
Corporate Bonds
Corporate bonds and syndicated loans both include issuance by ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Com-
mercial paper excludes issuance by provinces/municipalities, federal agencies, and the federal govern-
ment. Source: Bank of Canada, DBRS and Dealscan.




























1995h1 1997h1 1999h1 2001h1 2003h1 2005h1 2007h1 2009h1
Total Syndicated Loans Real Investment Loans
Revolving Lines
Revolving lines (bi-annual) include credit facilities with less and more than one year maturity. Real
investment loans (bi-annual) are deﬁned as those intended for general corporate purposes, capital ex-
penditure, or working capital. Source: DealScan
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Public Firms Private Firms
Total syndicated loans (bi-annual) by private and public Canadian ﬁrms. Source: DealScan.
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Total Syndicated Loans Revolving Lines
Real Investment Loans
The graph shows the percentage change in lending for each quarter with respect to the second quarter
of 2007. Source: DealScan
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CDOR−OIS spread: 1 Month CDOR−OIS spread: 3 Month
This graph shows the CDOR-OIS spreads (in percent) for one and three months contracts.










2001q1 2002q2 2003q3 2004q4 2006q1 2007q2 2008q3 2009q4
Wholesale Funding I Wholesale Funding II
Wholesale Funding III
The graph shows the percentage change in the ratio of wholesale funding to total funding (wholesale and
retail funding) for each quarter with respect to 2007:Q4 (∆ = WholesaleFunding=TotalFundingt  
WholesaleFunding=TotalFunding2007q4). Wholesale Funding I is the ratio of ﬁxed term, demand and
notice deposits by deposit-taking institutions over total funding. Wholesale Funding II is the ratio of
ﬁxed term, demand and notice deposits by deposit-taking institutions, and banker acceptances over
total funding. Wholesale Funding III is the ratio of ﬁxed term, and demand and notice deposits by
deposit-taking institutions, banker acceptances and repo over total funding.








2007q2 2008q1 2008q4 2009q3
Syndicated Loans Commercial Loans
Commercial Loans less Drawdowns
The graph shows the percentage change in the total amount of syndicated loans and commercial loans
(less drawdowns on previous commitments) with respect to 2007:Q4.
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Wholesale Funding Ratio
The graph shows the relationship between credit line drawdowns as a fraction of all existing credit lines
and the ratio of wholesale funding over the period 2007:Q3-2009Q4.
31Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of various loan, borrower and lender characteristics.
Tranche (or loan facility) is the dollar amount of loan facility in Canadian million dollars. Ma-
turity, reported in months, is length in months between facility activation date and maturity date.
AISD, in basis points, includes all costs of a drawn loan to the borrower. Restruct. loan is a
dummy variable that equals one for loans intended for restructuring: leveraged buyouts, mergers
and acquisitions, or share repurchases and zero for loans intended for corporate purposes, capital
expenditure, or working capital. Corporate Purpose is a dummy variable that indicates if a loan is
intended for general corporate purposes, capital expenditure, or working capital. Credit line is a
dummy variable equal to one if the facility is credit line and zero for the rest (mainly term loans).
Syndicate size is the number of lenders in the syndicate. Lead share is the percent of the loan kept
by the lead arranger. Firm characteristics are from Compustat. Firms assets is the quarterly book
value of assets by the borrower (in CAD million). Sales is the quarterly value of net sales from
Compustat. Market-to-Book is the ratio of both book value of assets minus book value of equity
plus market value of equity over book value of assets. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant,
and equipment to total assets. Proﬁtability is the ratio of EBITDA to sales. Leverage is the ratio of
book value of debt to total assets. Current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.
Wholesale Funding Ratio is the ratio of wholesale funding (bank acceptances, repos, ﬁxed term, and
demand and notice deposits by deposit-taking institutions) over total funding (wholesale funding
and retail funding: demand and ﬁxed-term deposits by individuals). Capital Ratio is Tier 1 capital
over assets. Impaired loans is the ratio of impaired business loans to total business loans.
N Mean SD 25th Median 75th
Loan Characteristics
Tranche (CAD million) 4897 300 686 44 115 300
Maturity (months) 4897 41 37 12 36 60
AISD spread (bp) 1990 223 158 100 200 300
Restruct. Loan 4897 0.09 0.28
Corporate Purpose 4897 0.62 0.48
Credit Line 4897 0.65 0.45
Syndicate size (number) 4897 5.23 5.02 2 4 7
Lead Share 4897 0.36 0.3 0.14 0.25 0.5
Firm Characteristics
Firms assets 1278 3,686 5,955 489 1188 3741
Sales 1278 640.12 1,091 65 204.45 599
Market-to-Book 1278 1.26 0.71 1.01 1.26 1.65
Tangibility 1278 0.3 0.29 0.3 0.58 0.8
Proﬁtability 1278 0.28 0.28 0.1 0.23 0.48
Leverage 1278 0.29 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.39
Current Ratio 1278 1.4 0.99 0.75 1.16 1.81
Bank Characteristics
Wholesale Funding Ratio 1133 0.41 0.2 0.31 0.37 0.42
Cash/Assets 1133 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08
Capital ratio 1133 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.10
Impaired loans 1133 0.03 0.002 0.01 0.02 0.04
32Table 2: Syndicated Market Structure
Shares of top ten banks in the syndicated loan market. In the ﬁrst column the market share is the
ratio of bank deals to all deals over the sample period; in the second column, the sample period is
from 2007:Q4 to 2009:Q4.
Market Share Market Share
Full Sample (2007:Q4-2009:Q4)
Royal Bank of Canada 0.19 0.13
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 0.17 0.11
Bank of Nova Scotia 0.12 0.10
Toronto Dominion Bank 0.11 0.12
Bank of Montreal 0.07 0.09
Chase Manhattan Bank 0.07
Citibank 0.02
National Bank of Canada 0.02 0.04
Barclays Capital 0.02 0.12
JP Morgan 0.02
Credit Suisse First Boston 0.02
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Public vs Private Firms
Tranche (or loan facility) is the dollar amount of loan facility in Canadian million dollars. AISD, in
basis points, includes all costs of a drawn loan to the borrower. Maturity is length in months between
facility activation date and maturity date. Investment grade is the percent of rated public/private
ﬁrms which have senior debt rated BBB or above by S&P. Credit line is a dummy variable equal
to one if the facility is credit line and zero for the rest (mainly term loans). Syndicate size is the
number of lenders in the syndicate. Number of diﬀerent banks is the number of diﬀerent banks per
borrower.
Public Private Public-Private
Number of ﬁrms 463 1006
Tranche (CAD million) 377.36 247.19 130.1***
AISD 214 228 14**
Number of deals 3.29 1.87 1.42***
Maturity (in months) 37.5 42.69 -5.19***
Investment loan(% ﬁrms) 63 61 2*
Credit line (% ﬁrms) 69 62 7***
Syndicate size (in number) 5.21 4.85 0.8***
Number of diﬀerent banks 2.11 1.19 0.92*
33Table 4: Wholesale Funding and Lending Availability
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) and (4) is the natural log of syndicated loan facility. In columns (3) and (5)
the dependent variable is the ratio of syndicated loans over ﬁrm assets. WHOLESALE2007 is the ratio of wholesale
funding (banker acceptances, repos, ﬁxed term, and demand and notice deposits by deposit-taking institutions) to
total funding (wholesale funding and demand and ﬁxed-term deposits by individuals). For the period 2007:Q4 to
2010:Q1 the values of WHOLESALE2007 are ﬁxed to the pre-crisis period that is the ﬁrst three quarters of 2007.
CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes one for loans originated from the 2007:Q4 to 2009:Q4. High Capital is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one for banks having capital over assets higher than the quarterly median and
zero otherwise. InvLoans is a dummy variable for loans used for corporate purposed, capital expenditure and working
capital. Credit line is a dummy variable equal to one if the facility is credit line and zero for the rest (mainly term
loans). Syndicate size is the number of lenders in the syndicate. GDP is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. Yield
Spread is the log of the diﬀerence between the indexes on the yield of the triple-A rated 7 year corporate bonds and
seven year Canadian government bonds. M/B is the ratio of both book value of assets minus book value of equity
plus market value of equity over book value of assets. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to
total assets. Protability is the ratio of EBITDA to sales. Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets.
Current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the ﬁrm level. All models include yearly, monthly, quarterly, bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Public Private Public Public Public
log(loan) log(loan) log( loan
assets) log(loan) log( loan
assets)
CRISIS  WHOLESALE2007 -0.87** 0.12 -0.58* -0.88** -1.04**
(0.439) (0.448) (0.351) (0.442) (0.456)
WHOLESALE2007 0.97* 0.26 0.39 1.00 1.01
(0.571) (0.755) (0.55) (0.678) (0.659)
CRISIS 0.56* -0.14 0.45 0.58* 0.63
(0.317) (0.311) (0.331) (0.319) (0.361)
Log(cash=assets)t 1 -0.08 0.06 -0.16** -0.08 -0.09
(0.079) (0.087) (0.071) (0.090) (0.091)
High Capital -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05
(0.049) (0.038) (0.005) (0.050) (0.052)
Log(bank assets)t 1 0.14 -0.47 0.18 -0.13 -0.17
(0.239) (0.289) (0.231) (0.301) (0.295)
Log(maturity) 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.048) (0.051) (0.005) (0.052) (0.054)
InvLoans 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.07
(0.073) (0.059) (0.018) (0.087) (0.092)
Credit Line 0.10 -0.09 0.10 0.17 0.19*
(0.094) (0.073) (0.101) (0.113) (0.115)
log(syndicate size) 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.30*** 0.43*** 0.36***
(0.074) (0.082) (0.071) (0.082) (0.092)
GDP 0.05* -0.03 0.01 0.08 0.05
(0.030) (0.035) (0.014) (0.077) (0.039)
Y ield Spread 0.13* 0.06 0.03 0.06* 0.09
(0.073) (0.069) (0.04) (0.035) (0.081)










Current ratiot 1 0.03 0.02
(0.030) (0.003)
Obs. 1,718 2,001 1,718 1,718 1,718
R2 0.13 0.108 0.112 0.146 0.15Table 5: Wholesale Funding and Lending Availability: Cross-Sectional Results
The dependent variable is the natural log of syndicated loan facility in columns (1) to (2); in column
(3) the dependent variable Investments is measured as the ratio of ﬁrm capital expenditures divided
by lagged property, plant and equipment. In column (1) the sample includes both private and
public ﬁrms. variable is the ratio of syndicated loans over ﬁrm assets. NONINV is a ﬁrm level
dummy variable that takes one for investment values lower than the sample median. PUBLIC is
an indicator variable that takes one for ﬁrms that are publicly listed and zero otherwise. Dealscan
indicates whether a public ﬁrm has syndicated loan in a certain quarter; it takes zero if a public ﬁrm
does not access such type of ﬁnancing. WHOLESALE2007 is the ratio of wholesale funding (banker
acceptances, repos, ﬁxed term, and demand and notice deposits by deposit-taking institutions) to
total funding (wholesale funding and demand and ﬁxed-term deposits by individuals). For the
period 2007:Q4 to 2010:Q1 the values of WHOLESALE2007 are ﬁxed to the pre-crisis period that
is the ﬁrst three quarters of 2007. CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes one for loans originated
from the 2007:Q4 to 2009:Q4. In columns (1) to (2) all speciﬁcations include complete interaction
terms (unreported for brevity) between WHOLESALE2007, CRISIS, and the corresponding ﬁrm
level dummy variables. For columns (1) to (2) ﬁrm, bank and loan controls are deﬁned in Table 4.
In column (3) the ﬁrm controls include Tobin Q (market value of equity plus the book value of debt
minus deferred taxes divided by book value of assets), cash ﬂow (net income before extraordinary
items plus depreciation and amortization divided by lagged property, plant and equipment), and
ﬁrm size (log of ﬁrm assets). The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ﬁrm level. All
models include yearly, monthly, and quarterly. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
log(loan) Investments
CRISIS  PUBLIC  WHOLESALE2007 -1.214**
(0.592)
CRISIS  WHOLESALE2007  NONINV -2.043**
(1.008)
CRISIS  Dealscan 0.02*
(0.010)




CRISIS  WHOLESALE2007 0.424 0.195
(0.469) (0.747)
Firms Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes No
Loan Controls Yes Yes No
Bank FE Yes Yes No
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3.700 1,718 7,316
R2 0.15 0.16 0.241
35Table 6: Robustness Checks
WHOLESALE2007 is the ratio of wholesale funding (banker acceptances, repos, ﬁxed term, and
demand and notice deposits by deposit-taking institutions) to total funding (wholesale funding and
demand and ﬁxed-term deposits by individuals). For the period 2007:Q4 to 2010:Q1 the values of
WHOLESALE2007 are ﬁxed to the pre-crisis period that is the ﬁrst three quarters of 2007. In
the upper panel: H WHOLESALE is a dummy variable that takes one for values higher than the
monthly median for the period 1995 to 2004. CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one for loans originated from the 2001:Q3 to 2004:Q4. In the middle panel: for the period 2007Q4 to
2010Q1 the values of wholesale funding are ﬁxed to the pre-crisis period that is the ﬁrst two quarters
of 2007. Impaired loans is the ratio of quarterly non-performing commercial and industrial loans to
total amount of commercial and industrial loans. CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value
one for loans originated from the 2007:Q4 to 2009:Q4. In the bottom panel: All speciﬁcation include
syndicate ﬁxed eﬀects. All speciﬁcations include the same set of control variables as in Table 4.
The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at ﬁrm levels. All models include yearly, monthly,
quarterly, bank and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Public Private Public Public Public
log(loan) log(loan) log( loan
assets) log(loan) log( loan
assets)
CRISIS2001  H WHOLESALE 0.54*** 0.10 0.33* 0.52*** 0.48*
(0.191) (0.178) (0.031) (0.191) (0.172)
H WHOLESALE -0.41** -0.01 -0.4** -0.15 -0.72**
(0.175) (0.286) (0.039) (0.220) (0.23)
CRISIS2001 -0.83** -0.14 -0.70 -0.61*** -0.22
(0.376) (0.334) (0.109) (0.380) (0.371)
Obs. 422 485 422 422 422
R2 0.140 0.203 0.19 0.16 0.13
CRISIS  WHOLESALE2007 -0.68* 0.45 -0.42 -0.81* -0.872*
(0.371) (0.449) (0.561) (0.483) (0.501)
WHOLESALE2007 0.45 -0.05 0.23 1.11 0.79
(0.604) (0.869) (0.59) (0.768) (0.841)
CRISIS 0.47 -0.36 0.39 0.55* 0.55
(0.324) (0.308) (0.39) (0.323) (0.37)
Impaired Loans -0.99 -5.02** -0.59 -2.31 -1.94
(2.886) (2.046) (0.509) (2.2) (3.01)
Obs. 1,692 1,827 1,449 1,692 1,692
R2 0.14 0.085 0.113 0.13 0.13
CRISIS  WHOLESALE2007 -0.73* 0.56 -0.33 -0.54 -0.61*
(0.425) (0.398) (0.541) (0.489) (0.38)
WHOLESALE2007 0.82** -0.31 0.55* 0.64* 0.66*
(0.354) (0.319) (0.301) (0.365) (0.401)
CRISIS 0.39 -0.38 0.27 0.26 0.33
(0.314) (0.267) (0.371) (0.325) (0.371)
Syndicate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,718 1,827 1,718 1,718 1,718
R2 0.167 0.153 0.17 0.172 0.171
36Table 7: Availability of Syndicated Loans and Lending Relationships
The dependent variable is log(loan). WHOLESALE2007 is the ratio of wholesale funding (banker
acceptances, repos, ﬁxed term, and demand and notice deposits by deposit-taking institutions) to
total funding (wholesale funding and demand and ﬁxed-term deposits by individuals). For the
period 2007:Q4 to 2009:Q4 the values of WHOLESALE2007 are ﬁxed to the value in the pre-crisis
period that is the ﬁrst three quarters of 2007. CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value one
for loans originated from the 2007:Q4 to 2009:Q4. REL MANY is a dummy variable that takes one
if a ﬁrm has a past loan from more than one bank. The standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the ﬁrm level. All models include bank, ﬁrm and loan controls, year, month, quarter, bank, and
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects as in Table 4. In columns 3 and 4, instead of bank ﬁxed eﬀects we use syndicate
ﬁxed eﬀects. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Public Private Public Private
CRISIS -8.94* -0.37 -0.22 0.10
(5.167) (0.728) (2.039) (0.694)
WHOLESALE2007 2.22** 0.26 1.38 -0.13
(0.902) (0.919) (0.999) (0.754)
REL MANY 1.04** 0.42 0.75 -0.13
(0.493) (0.333) (0.554) (0.754)
CRISIS  WHOLESALE2007 13.96* 0.64 0.32 -0.05
(8.139) (1.181) (3.260) (1.142)
CRISIS  REL MANY 9.30* 0.11 0.11 -0.65
(5.155) (0.663) (2.068) (0.785)
WHOLESALE2007  REL MANY -1.72** -0.72 -0.57 0.57
(0.873) (0.595) (0.982) (0.824)
WHOLESALE2007  REL MANY  CRISIS -14.55* -0.22 -0.14 1.34
(8.119) (1.145) (3.339) (1.360)
Syndicate FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,619 1,911 1,619 1,911
R2 0.094 0.069 0.154 1,911
37